Below is a guest post from Garv Malhotra who is a final year student at GNLU, Gandhinagar.
A substantial amount of literature has been dedicated to the topic of the Scope of Public Policy as a ground for 'set-aside' of Domestic arbitral awards under Section 34 (2)(b)(ii) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, especially in the past decade since the infamous expansive interpretation of the term 'public policy' by the Apex court. The decision in the case of ONGC v. Saw Pipes[1] has attracted much flak from all quarters[2]. However, recent decisions of the Supreme Court in the McDermott[3], Sumitomo[4], Rashtriya Ispat[5] among other[6] cases among others that have attempted to water down the ONGC Doctrine without overruling the same.
The Law relating set-aside of Domestic arbitral awards in India is laid down under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. It is based on Article 34 of the Model Law and states that the grounds contained therein are the "only" grounds on which an award may be set aside. However in the Indian context the word "only" prefixing the grounds is a bit of a misnomer as two additional grounds have been created by the Act itself under Section 13(5) and 16(6). Besides another ground of fraud and corruption is found in an Explanation to the public policy ground in Section 34.[7]
The scope of challenge and set-aside of a final award of a tribunal is very restricted as there is a legal presumption in favour of the validity of an award.[8] The arbitrator's interpretation of the contract and his decision on the merits of the case cannot be re-examined by the court and it cannot substitute its own decision in place of the final and binding award.[9] Additionally, the reasonableness of the reasons given by the arbitrator cannot are not subject to challenge in a court of law.[10] The court cannot simply term the award on fact and/or law erroneous and substitute the award with their own judicial decision[11] and where the opinion of the arbitrator is plausible[12], the courts will not interfere. In effect, if the tribunal passes an award (as per Section 31) or an order under Section 16(2) or 16(3) after considering rival submissions on both fact and law, its decision cannot be interfered with unless the conclusion shocks the consciousness with a blatant error apparent from a prima facie perusal of the award.
Though most other grounds of set-aside mentioned in Section 34 can be literally constructed, the most malleable among all grounds is the residuary ground under S. 34 i.e. the award can be set aside if found violative of the 'public policy' of India, leaving room for immense 'judicial legislation' on the point. It is known that the term 'public policy' is incapable of any precise definition, however, some light may be drawn from the Ministry of Law, Justice and Company Affairs, Government of India's attempt[13]- "A set of principles in accordance with which communities need to be regulated to achieve the good of the entire community or public"
The reason why Public Policy is incapable of any precise definition is because it is a concept premised on the socio-cultural needs of every society as distinguished from the socio-political Policies. e.g. the consumption of alcohol, though ubiquitous in most countries may be against the Public Policy in some Gulf Countries.
The term 'public policy' has been called an 'unruly horse'[14] as it is a dynamic concept, not being static at anytime, in any jurisdiction . It is a residuary ground that vests with the judges a powers analogues to a 'Henry VIIIth Clause' i.e. 'power to remove difficulties' in Administration Law. This power can also be compared to the common law canon of Justice, Equity and Good Conscience. Clearly, the term public policy is very open ended and is impossible to straitjacket[15]. However, unlike the two analogies hereinbefore mentioned, the interpretation of 'public policy' has to be done in the backdrop of the intervention-restrictive scheme of the Act as seen from the Statement of Objects and Reasons and Section 5.
The term public policy is capable of both a narrow and a broad interpretation depending upon the socio-cultural needs of the society[16] and the pendulum of the Apex Court's interpretation has oscillated between both these stands for decades without conclusive settlement[17]. However, in the ONGC case, the court disturbed the delicate balance between party autonomy and judicial supervision sought to be achieved by Section 34 and tilted the scales strongly in favour of the latter thereby setting the clock back to the old position where an award could be challenged on merits and indeed renders the court (testing enforceability of an award) as a court of appeal. It opened the floodgates to many previously barred challenges on vague assertions of statutory violations or interpretation of documents or the law. Invariably today, almost every dispute being arbitrated is further being litigated under the garb of challenge.
Recent Developments
It has been over a decade since the highly criticised ONGC Judgement but no bench faced with a similar question has recommended the Chief Justice to constitute a review bench. ONGC still stands as the Locus Classicus on the interpretation of Public policy. However, a few recent decision benches of the Supreme Court of equivalent strength as ONGC have attempted to dilute its overtly expansive interpretation without sitting in review of the ratio.
In the McDermott Industries v. Burn Standard[18] the Supreme Court held-
"The 1996 Act makes provision for the supervisory role of courts for review of the arbitral award only to ensure fairness. Intervention of the court is envisaged in few circumstances only, like in case of fraud or bias by the arbitrators, violation of natural justice, etc. The court cannot correct the errors of the arbitrators...this can be justified as the parties to the agreement make a conscious decision to exclude the court's jurisdiction by opting for arbitration as they prefer the expediency and finality offered by it."
In Sumitomo Heavy Industries Ltd. v. ONGC Ltd.[19] the Hon'ble Supreme Court, relying on another recent decision in SAIL v. Gupta Brothers Steel Tubes Ltd.[20] held that the umpire is legitimately entitled to take the view which he holds to be correct...hence if the conclusion of the arbitrator is based on a possible view of the matter, the court is not expected to intervene. The Court further reiterated the position that a 'perverse view' is not a finding against the weight of the evidence but against the evidence itself of the grounds of inadmissibility or irrelevance.
Further in the Rashtriya Ispat Nigam Ltd. v. Dewan Chand Ram Saran[21], the Supreme Court upheld the interpretation of the court in Sumitomo Case and SAIL Case and opined that even if the decision of the arbitrator is possible if not plausible, the court would not be justified in interfering.
The author submits that the overtly expansive stance on Public Policy as laid down in the ONGC Case is defeating the main objectives of the Act. It renders the Arbitral Tribunal a mere forum at the bottom of the Court hierarchy subject to just as many actions as a traditionally litigated dispute. Invariably today, most of the arbitral awards are challenged on grounds of violation of public policy and patent illegality premised on vague assertions of statutory violations imploring the court to 're-adjudicate' issues of fact and law under the pretext of a challenge. The recent decisions of the Supreme Court and a few High Court decisions mark a welcome trend in watering down the ONGC Doctrine and upholding the restrictive sanctity of the Act. However, it is only up to the next bench faced with a similar question to request the Chief Justice of India to constitute a larger bench to review this position and salvage the Domestic Arbitration scenario in India.
[1] (2003) 5 SCC 705.
[2] Sumeet Kachwaha, Arbitration Law of India: A Critical Analysis, Asia International Arbitrational Journal, Volume 1, Number 2, P. 105 http://www.kaplegal.com/upload/pdf/arbitration-law-india-critical-analysis.pdf ; Speech delivered by Mr. F.S. Nariman at the inaugural session of “Legal reforms in Infrastructure”.
[3] (2006) 11 SCC 181.
[4] (2010) 11 SCC 296.
[5] (2012) 5 SCC 306.
[6] SAIL v. Gupta Brothers Steel Tubes Ltd (2009) 10 SCC 63, Kwality Mfg. Corpn. v. Central Warehousing Corporation (2009) 5 SCC 142; Arulvelu v. State (2009) 10 SCC 206.
[7] Sumeet Kachwaha, Enforcement of Arbitration Awards in India, Asian International Arbitration Journal, Volume 4, Number 1, PAGES 64-82.
[8] Union of India v. Jai Narayan Misra AIR 1970 SC 753; Food Corporation of India v. Joginder Mahinderpal AIR 1989 SC 1263.
[9] Union of India v. Jai Narayan Misra AIR 1970 SC 753; Francis Klein Pvt. Ltd. v. Union of India 1995 2 Arb LR 298.
[10] Municipal Corporation of Delhi v. Jagan Nath Ashok Kumar AIR 1987 SC 2316; Id.
[11] Lakshmi Mathur v. CGM, MTNL 2000 (2) ArbLR 684 Bom.
[12] Supra Note 4, 5, 6.
[13] P Anklesaria, "Scope of the expression Public Policy in Domestic and Foreign Awards". 9 AIR (2005) at 310.
[14] Burrough, J., Richardson v. Mellish (1824), 2 Bing. 252; (1824) 130 Eng. Rep. 294, 303.
[15] O.P. Malhotra, The Law and Practice of Arbitration and Conciliation (New Delhi: Lexis Nexis Butterworths, 2002) at 768.
[16] Supra Note 19.
[17] For a narrow view refer- Gherulal Parekh v. Mahadeodas Maiya AIR1959 SC 781 and Renusagar Power Co. Ltd. v. General Electric Co. AIR 1986 SC 1571; For a Broad view refer- Central Inland Water Transport Corp. Ltd. v. Brojo Nath Ganguly1986 SCR (2) 278 and ONGC v. Saw Pipes AIR 2003 SC 2629.
[18] (2006) 11 SCC 181 para 52.
[19] (2010) 11 SCC 296 para 41-43.
[20] (2010) 11 SCC 296.
[21] (2012) 5 SCC 306 para 43-45.
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