Saturday, August 23, 2014
Friday, August 22, 2014
Below is a guest post from Garv Malhotra who is a final year student at GNLU, Gandhinagar.
A substantial amount of literature has been dedicated to the topic of the Scope of Public Policy as a ground for 'set-aside' of Domestic arbitral awards under Section 34 (2)(b)(ii) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, especially in the past decade since the infamous expansive interpretation of the term 'public policy' by the Apex court. The decision in the case of ONGC v. Saw Pipes has attracted much flak from all quarters. However, recent decisions of the Supreme Court in the McDermott, Sumitomo, Rashtriya Ispat among other cases among others that have attempted to water down the ONGC Doctrine without overruling the same.
The Law relating set-aside of Domestic arbitral awards in India is laid down under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. It is based on Article 34 of the Model Law and states that the grounds contained therein are the "only" grounds on which an award may be set aside. However in the Indian context the word "only" prefixing the grounds is a bit of a misnomer as two additional grounds have been created by the Act itself under Section 13(5) and 16(6). Besides another ground of fraud and corruption is found in an Explanation to the public policy ground in Section 34.
The scope of challenge and set-aside of a final award of a tribunal is very restricted as there is a legal presumption in favour of the validity of an award. The arbitrator's interpretation of the contract and his decision on the merits of the case cannot be re-examined by the court and it cannot substitute its own decision in place of the final and binding award. Additionally, the reasonableness of the reasons given by the arbitrator cannot are not subject to challenge in a court of law. The court cannot simply term the award on fact and/or law erroneous and substitute the award with their own judicial decision and where the opinion of the arbitrator is plausible, the courts will not interfere. In effect, if the tribunal passes an award (as per Section 31) or an order under Section 16(2) or 16(3) after considering rival submissions on both fact and law, its decision cannot be interfered with unless the conclusion shocks the consciousness with a blatant error apparent from a prima facie perusal of the award.
Though most other grounds of set-aside mentioned in Section 34 can be literally constructed, the most malleable among all grounds is the residuary ground under S. 34 i.e. the award can be set aside if found violative of the 'public policy' of India, leaving room for immense 'judicial legislation' on the point. It is known that the term 'public policy' is incapable of any precise definition, however, some light may be drawn from the Ministry of Law, Justice and Company Affairs, Government of India's attempt- "A set of principles in accordance with which communities need to be regulated to achieve the good of the entire community or public"
The reason why Public Policy is incapable of any precise definition is because it is a concept premised on the socio-cultural needs of every society as distinguished from the socio-political Policies. e.g. the consumption of alcohol, though ubiquitous in most countries may be against the Public Policy in some Gulf Countries.
The term 'public policy' has been called an 'unruly horse' as it is a dynamic concept, not being static at anytime, in any jurisdiction . It is a residuary ground that vests with the judges a powers analogues to a 'Henry VIIIth Clause' i.e. 'power to remove difficulties' in Administration Law. This power can also be compared to the common law canon of Justice, Equity and Good Conscience. Clearly, the term public policy is very open ended and is impossible to straitjacket. However, unlike the two analogies hereinbefore mentioned, the interpretation of 'public policy' has to be done in the backdrop of the intervention-restrictive scheme of the Act as seen from the Statement of Objects and Reasons and Section 5.
The term public policy is capable of both a narrow and a broad interpretation depending upon the socio-cultural needs of the society and the pendulum of the Apex Court's interpretation has oscillated between both these stands for decades without conclusive settlement. However, in the ONGC case, the court disturbed the delicate balance between party autonomy and judicial supervision sought to be achieved by Section 34 and tilted the scales strongly in favour of the latter thereby setting the clock back to the old position where an award could be challenged on merits and indeed renders the court (testing enforceability of an award) as a court of appeal. It opened the floodgates to many previously barred challenges on vague assertions of statutory violations or interpretation of documents or the law. Invariably today, almost every dispute being arbitrated is further being litigated under the garb of challenge.
It has been over a decade since the highly criticised ONGC Judgement but no bench faced with a similar question has recommended the Chief Justice to constitute a review bench. ONGC still stands as the Locus Classicus on the interpretation of Public policy. However, a few recent decision benches of the Supreme Court of equivalent strength as ONGC have attempted to dilute its overtly expansive interpretation without sitting in review of the ratio.
In the McDermott Industries v. Burn Standard the Supreme Court held-
"The 1996 Act makes provision for the supervisory role of courts for review of the arbitral award only to ensure fairness. Intervention of the court is envisaged in few circumstances only, like in case of fraud or bias by the arbitrators, violation of natural justice, etc. The court cannot correct the errors of the arbitrators...this can be justified as the parties to the agreement make a conscious decision to exclude the court's jurisdiction by opting for arbitration as they prefer the expediency and finality offered by it."
In Sumitomo Heavy Industries Ltd. v. ONGC Ltd. the Hon'ble Supreme Court, relying on another recent decision in SAIL v. Gupta Brothers Steel Tubes Ltd. held that the umpire is legitimately entitled to take the view which he holds to be correct...hence if the conclusion of the arbitrator is based on a possible view of the matter, the court is not expected to intervene. The Court further reiterated the position that a 'perverse view' is not a finding against the weight of the evidence but against the evidence itself of the grounds of inadmissibility or irrelevance.
Further in the Rashtriya Ispat Nigam Ltd. v. Dewan Chand Ram Saran, the Supreme Court upheld the interpretation of the court in Sumitomo Case and SAIL Case and opined that even if the decision of the arbitrator is possible if not plausible, the court would not be justified in interfering.
The author submits that the overtly expansive stance on Public Policy as laid down in the ONGC Case is defeating the main objectives of the Act. It renders the Arbitral Tribunal a mere forum at the bottom of the Court hierarchy subject to just as many actions as a traditionally litigated dispute. Invariably today, most of the arbitral awards are challenged on grounds of violation of public policy and patent illegality premised on vague assertions of statutory violations imploring the court to 're-adjudicate' issues of fact and law under the pretext of a challenge. The recent decisions of the Supreme Court and a few High Court decisions mark a welcome trend in watering down the ONGC Doctrine and upholding the restrictive sanctity of the Act. However, it is only up to the next bench faced with a similar question to request the Chief Justice of India to constitute a larger bench to review this position and salvage the Domestic Arbitration scenario in India.
 (2003) 5 SCC 705.
 Sumeet Kachwaha, Arbitration Law of India: A Critical Analysis, Asia International Arbitrational Journal, Volume 1, Number 2, P. 105 http://www.kaplegal.com/upload/pdf/arbitration-law-india-critical-analysis.pdf ; Speech delivered by Mr. F.S. Nariman at the inaugural session of “Legal reforms in Infrastructure”.
 (2006) 11 SCC 181.
 (2010) 11 SCC 296.
 (2012) 5 SCC 306.
 SAIL v. Gupta Brothers Steel Tubes Ltd (2009) 10 SCC 63, Kwality Mfg. Corpn. v. Central Warehousing Corporation (2009) 5 SCC 142; Arulvelu v. State (2009) 10 SCC 206.
 Sumeet Kachwaha, Enforcement of Arbitration Awards in India, Asian International Arbitration Journal, Volume 4, Number 1, PAGES 64-82.
 Union of India v. Jai Narayan Misra AIR 1970 SC 753; Food Corporation of India v. Joginder Mahinderpal AIR 1989 SC 1263.
 Union of India v. Jai Narayan Misra AIR 1970 SC 753; Francis Klein Pvt. Ltd. v. Union of India 1995 2 Arb LR 298.
 Municipal Corporation of Delhi v. Jagan Nath Ashok Kumar AIR 1987 SC 2316; Id.
 Lakshmi Mathur v. CGM, MTNL 2000 (2) ArbLR 684 Bom.
 Supra Note 4, 5, 6.
 P Anklesaria, "Scope of the expression Public Policy in Domestic and Foreign Awards". 9 AIR (2005) at 310.
 Burrough, J., Richardson v. Mellish (1824), 2 Bing. 252; (1824) 130 Eng. Rep. 294, 303.
 O.P. Malhotra, The Law and Practice of Arbitration and Conciliation (New Delhi: Lexis Nexis Butterworths, 2002) at 768.
 Supra Note 19.
 For a narrow view refer- Gherulal Parekh v. Mahadeodas Maiya AIR1959 SC 781 and Renusagar Power Co. Ltd. v. General Electric Co. AIR 1986 SC 1571; For a Broad view refer- Central Inland Water Transport Corp. Ltd. v. Brojo Nath Ganguly1986 SCR (2) 278 and ONGC v. Saw Pipes AIR 2003 SC 2629.
 (2006) 11 SCC 181 para 52.
 (2010) 11 SCC 296 para 41-43.
 (2010) 11 SCC 296.
 (2012) 5 SCC 306 para 43-45.
The Panna-Mukta Arbitrations: The Indian Supreme Court Adopts a Pro-Arbitration Stance. Another Step In The Right Direction?
Below is guest post from Nimoy Kher who is a third year student at NLSIU, Bangalore.
In what may be seen as yet another step towards a more arbitration-friendly atmosphere in India, the Supreme Court of India on 27th May, in the case of Reliance Industries and Anr. v. Union of India denied Indian courts’ jurisdiction over an ongoing foreign arbitration proceeding.
By way of context, the factual matrix surrounding the case is as follows. There were two Production Sharing Contracts (PSCs) between the parties to the dispute. These PSCs dealt with the exploration and production of petroleum from the Tapti and Panna-Mukta Fields located just off the western coast of Mumbai. In 2010, certain disputes arose between the parties with regard to these PSCs, and Reliance Industries referred the disputes to arbitration, in accordance with the contracts. The government argued that the claims before the tribunal were non-arbitrable on several grounds. The arbitral tribunal, however, passed a final partial award declaring that it had jurisdiction over the parties’ disputes.
Subsequently, the government sought to set-aside this partial award under S.34 of the Indian arbitration statute. Reliance Industries opposed the maintainability of the setting aside petition. Reliance Industries based their challenge to the setting-aside petition on the argument that S. 34 falls under Part I of Indian Statute, and would therefore apply only to domestic or Indian seated arbitrations. Further, Reliance Industries argued that the arbitration agreements in the PSCs expressly named England as the seat of the arbitration and as such, all challenges to the award would lie in England. The government, on the other hand, argued that S.34 would apply to the award since it was clear from parties’ agreement that they did not intend to oust the applicability of the Indian statute, and also since the disputes between the parties involved substantial questions affecting Indian public interest.
The High Court placed heavy reliance on judgments such as Bhatia International v. Bulk Trading S.A and Venture Global Engineering v. Satyam Computer Services to assert jurisdiction over the award under S.34. The court opined that S.34 would apply since there was neither an explicit nor implicit rejection of the domestic provisions of the Indian statute, as per the requirements of Bhatia International. To the contrary, the court gleaned a manifest desire to subject the arbitration agreement to Indian law, from parties’ choice of Indian law as proper law of the contract. The court reasoned that the fact parties had chosen the law of India to govern the substantive contract clearly indicated that parties did not intend to oust the applicability of Indian law. By choosing England as the seat, parties had merely desired that the English law would be the curial law, and would apply only to questions of the conduct of arbitral proceedings. For all other matters, including challenge of an award, Indian law would apply.
Further, the court reasoned that S.34 would apply since the parties in the instant case did not wish to exclude the applicability of Indian public policy. The court relied on Art.15 (1) of the PSCs which stated that “the companies and the operations under this Contract shall be subject to all fiscal legislation of India” to support this conclusion. In any case, irrespective of the parties’ intention, the High Court declared that it would retain jurisdiction over the award, since the question of the arbitrability of certain kinds of disputes must not be decided just against the touchstone of the lex arbitri. It stated that:
“Since the question of arbitrability of the claim is a larger question effecting public policy of State it should be determined by applying laws of India.”
It must be bourne in mind, that in Bharat Aluminium Co. Ltd. v. Kaiser Aluminium Technical Service Inc., a 2012 Supreme Court judgment, the court has overruled the judgments in Bhatia International and Venture Global. The Supreme Court has clearly stated that Part I of the Indian arbitration statute would not apply to foreign-seated arbitrations. However, as the High Court correctly recognized, the holding in the Bharat Aluminium Case applies prospectively, to arbitration agreements executed after 6th September 2012. Since the arbitration agreements in the present case were entered into before that date the High Court relied upon the ratio in Bhatia International and Venture Global to come to the aforementioned conclusions.
Fortunately, in appeal the Supreme Court comprehensively overruled the High Court on both issues. In light of the High Court judgment, the first issue that had to be determined was whether the choice of seat in the instant case, amounted to an implicit exclusion of the provisions of the arbitration act, and excluded the award from the ambit of S.34, as per the requirements laid down in Bhatia International. The Supreme Court found that in the instant case the choice of seat did, in fact, amount to an implicit exclusion of the Indian statute. The court concluded that a ‘meaningful reading’ of the terms of the contract clearly indicated that parties understood the distinction between the proper law of the contract and proper law of the arbitration agreement, and parties intended both to be different. The court opined:
“In our opinion, it is too late in the day to contend that the seat of arbitration is not analogous to an exclusive jurisdiction clause”
The court relied on a number of previous judgments such as Videocon Industries Ltd. v. Union of India and Anr. and Dozco v. Doosan Infracore Co.Ltd to find that the choice of seat clearly amounted to an ouster of the jurisdiction of Indian courts. Further, in clear contrast to the High Court ruling, the court held that the mere fact that Indian law applied to the PSC would not indicate that parties intended Indian law to be the proper law of the arbitration agreement.
With regard to the second issue – whether the Indian statute would apply by virtue of the fact that substantial questions of Indian interest involved - the court found that the applicability of the provisions of the statute would not depend on the nature of the challenge of the award. For the standard of public policy laid down in the Indian statute to apply, it would first have to be proved that the statute applied to begin with. Since, in the instant case the arbitration agreement fell outside the scope of the statute by virtue of the seat of the arbitration being England, an award passed thereunder would not be subject to setting aside proceedings under S.34. The mere fact that question of Indian public interest were involved was not sufficient to attract the applicability of the statute.
This judgment is commendable, since despite being forced to rely on the ruling in Bhatia International, the court still carved out a niche, which excluded the applicability of Part I of the Indian statute to the arbitration proceedings. This judgment clearly indicates the change in the attitude of Indian courts towards international arbitration. It indicates that the Indian judiciary is increasingly hesitant to exercise control over international arbitrations. Further, the Supreme Court has correctly identified the inconveniences that are likely to be caused to parties by allowing the applicability of the Indian statute to international arbitration. Finally, this judgment is significant because it explicitly recognizes the need to follow international trends embodied in other UNCITRAL Model Law and New York Convention. Post the holding in Bharat Aluminium Co Ltd. v. Kaiser Aluminium Technical Services Inc., this judgment will no doubt help bolster the confidence of the international arbitration community in India. The question remains, though: are these cases just flashes in the pan, or are they representative of a true change in the Indian arbitration landscape?
Tuesday, July 1, 2014
Below is a guest post from Devansh Mohta. Devansh is a lawyer practicing in the Supreme Court of India. This piece was was first published in the journal Chartered Accountant Practice Journal 44 issue.
The first step towards formulation of NYC was taken when ICC prepared the ‘Draft Convention on Enforcement of International Arbitral Awards on 13th March, 1953.. Upon its presentation to the ECOSOC, it was changed to “Draft Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards”. The “widespread interest” in advancing international commercial arbitration led to “UN Conference” which was held on 20th May, 1958 and NYC was signed and adopted on 10th June, 1958.
NYC sought to guarantee uniform recognition and easy enforcement of an arbitral award obtained through the autonomous system of arbitration. NYC and UNCITRAL Model Law (MAL) alongwith Rules, constitute a fine framework for international commercial arbitration. Therefore, significance of NYC to International Commercial Arbitration will be considered with reference to MAL.
Its relevance and application
NYC established an “international regime” to facilitate ‘recognition and enforcement’ of both the arbitration agreement as well as arbitral award. Both are discussed hereinafter under separate heading.
It was afforded recognition, by Article II, upon fulfilment of two conditions - of being written and of subject matter being arbitrable. And unless found “null and void, inoperative or incapable of being performed” Courts must enforce it upon request of one of the parties by referring them- sometimes even third parties- to arbitration. Failure of this obligation is breach of treaty.
An agreement is in writing if it satisfied the stated maximum standard. An invalid arbitration agreement would render an arbitral award unenforceable. This ‘maximum standard’ with passage of time became outdated. Therefore, MAL was used to widened its range by including modern means of communication that could constitute a written “arbitration agreement”. Recent amendment to MAL has diluted this requirement.
Arbitrability, which is usually the courts’ domain, except in some countries which have statutory provisions; affects the validity of both the agreement as well as the award.
NYC applies, in relation to the place of enforcement, to the following: (i) foreign award: those made in a different territory; (ii) non-domestic award: those are not considered domestic. (NYC awards)
Category (ii) broadened the scope of NYC. The following awards fall under this category: (i) those made under arbitration law of another state; (ii) those involving foreign element;(iii) a-national award (rare)
According to the Guide this provision conferred freedom to decide which award would be considered “domestic”. For instance, an award made in India will be considered “domestic”. However, the oft-cited case of Bergesen v. Muller dealt with the provisions of US Law which prescribed conditions rendering it non domestic.
Arbitral awards under NYC could be final, partial or preliminary and also of arbitral bodies, excluding procedural orders. MAL specifies the ‘form and content’ of an award, and new Article 17H renders “interim measures” by the arbitral tribunal binding. It is a reflection of changing trends.
It is pertinent to note that while NYC deals with the distinction between “foreign” and “domestic” awards, MAL is concerned with “international” and “non-international” arbitration. However, an “interim measure” is distinguishable from “arbitral award” to which NYC apply.
Recognition and/or Enforcement
Both concepts are different. Recognition means respecting the binding nature of the award and res judicata, notwithstanding its “enforcement”, which is seeking judicial assistance to carry out the award, in which “recognition” is implicit. Significantly, unlike Article V NYC; Article 36 MAL uses “or” instead of “and” differentiating recognition from enforcement
Article III NYC mandates recognition to an arbitral award as “binding”, however, this obligation arises when the arbitral award is brought to states territory and is limited to “NYC awards” only, whereas Article 35 MAL affords such recognition to any “arbitral award” irrespective of the place it is made. Article VI readwith Article V(1) (e) specify the effect of setting aside or suspension of award by competent authority of the country in which or under the law of which that award was made. Article 34 provides grounds for setting aside.
In BALCO v. Kaiser the Court held that the underlined provision did not confer concurrent jurisdiction as arbitral award could be annulled only by one court.
Some debate exist about Courts’ discretion, under Article V NYC, to refuse enforcement because of the expression “may be refused”. There are two points:
(i) expression “or” in Article V(1) that the grounds for refusal are disjunctive;
(ii) expression “may be” appearing both in Article V(i) and (2) must carry the same meaning and the yardstick applicable to refusal on the ground of public policy and arbitrability.
Thus, while Courts adopt a “pro-enforcement approach”, however, upon proof refusal must follow.
Under MAL enforcement provisions are provided Article 36.which retains with slight modification, the disjunctive grounds of NYC for refusing enforcement. Thus, Article 35 and 36 preserves the essence of NYC.
A balance between conformity and uniformity
NYC permits two reservations: Reciprocity and Commercial- these reservations limit the applicability of NYC and can be adopted by the Contracting State in their own way. With the list of countries ratifying the NYC increasing, “reciprocity” reservation is gradually becoming redundant.
The “commercial reservation” in NYC indicates its area of operation and was included to distinguish, for civil law countries, commercial transactions from the non-commercial. The commercial character of the subject matter is retained both in MAL and NYC.
MAL was conceived to establish uniform arbitral procedure to better serve the interest of International Commercial Arbitration. However, MAL had to confirm with NYC. So a balance was struck. By removing the limitation of applicability NYC. Firstly by elaborating the concept of “commercial”, MAL brought it out of the confines of national laws as it existed owing to the commercial reservation of NYC. Secondly, MAL was made applicable to all awards irrespective of the place it was made and therefore removing the difficulties posed by “reciprocity reservation”. MAL complemented NYC by making place relevant for conduct of arbitration and irrelevant for recognition and enforcement of award. Thus, meting out uniform recognition to all arbitral awards, without distinguishing between “foreign” and “domestic” awards.
 Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards. (NYC)
 Report and Preliminary Draft Convention adopted by the ICC Committee on International Commercial Arbitration.
 United Nations Economic and Social Council
 Report of the Committee on Enforcement of International Arbitral Awards E/2704 (28th March, 1955).
 Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards Memorandum by the Secretary General E/2840 (22nd March, 1956).
 Julian D. M. Lew , Loukas A. Mistelis , et al., Comparative International Commercial Arbitration, (Kluwer Law International 2003) pp. 17 – 30 (para 2.18)
 Chloro Control v. Severn Trent (2013)1 SCC 641
 Article II (3) of NYC “…The court of a Contracting State, when seized of an action in a matter in respect of which the parties have made an agreement within the meaning of this article, shall, at the request of one of the parties, refer the parties to arbitration, unless it finds that the said agreement is null and void, inoperative or incapable of being performed.” .The text of Article II was adopted much later on 6th June 1958 (E/CONF. 26/L/59).
 Ibid Article II(2)-“The term “agreement in writing” shall include an arbitral clause in a contract or an arbitration agreement, signed by the parties or contained in an exchange of letters or telegrams”
 Article V (1) (a): “Recognition and enforcement of the award may be refused, at the request of the party against whom it is invoked, only if that party furnishes to the competent authority where the recognition and enforcement is sought, proof that:(i) The parties to the agreement referred to in article II were, under the law applicable to them, under some incapacity, or the said agreement is not valid under the law to which the parties have subjected it or, failing any indication thereon, under the law of the country where the award was made”
 Article 7 of MAL (1985 version) Definition and Form of the Agreement
 Ibid [option 1] Article 7(3) “….(3) An arbitration agreement is in writing if its content is recorded in any form, whether or not the arbitration agreement or contract has been concluded orally, by conduct, or by other means.” (As adopted by the Commission at its thirty-ninth session, in 2006) and [option II] “….is an agreement by the parties to submit to arbitration all or certain disputes which have arisen or which may arise between them in respect of a defined legal relationship, whether contractual or not”
 Booz Allen & Hamilton v. SBI (2011)5 SCC 532
 Section 1030 German Arbitration Law 1998 (1) Any claim involving an economic interest ("vermögensrechtlicher Anspruch") can be the subject of an arbitration agreement. An arbitration agreement concerning claims not involving an economic interest shall have legal effect to the extent that the parties are entitled to conclude a settlement on the issue in dispute. (2) An arbitration agreement relating to disputes on the existence of a lease of residential accommodation within Germany shall be null and void. This does not apply to residential accommodation as specified in section 549 subs. 1 to 32 of the Civil Code. (3) Statutory provisions outside this Book by virtue of which certain disputes may not be submitted to arbitration, or may be submitted to arbitration only under certain conditions, remain unaffected.
 Article of II (2) and V(2) (a) NYC and Article 1(5) and Article 34 MAL
 ICCA’s Guide to Interpretation of the 1958 New York Convention (2012)
 Section 2(7) of the [Indian] Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996: “(7) An arbitral award made under this Part shall be considered as a domestic award.”
 710 F2d 928
 Resort Condominiums v. Bolwel (1993)118 ALR 655. But see section 27 (i) of [Singapore] International Arbitration Act. (amended in 2012)
 Article 31 of MAL
 MAL Artice 17H (i): “An interim measure issued by an arbitral tribunal shall be recognized as binding and, unless otherwise provided by the arbitral tribunal, enforced upon application to the competent court, irrespective of the country in which it was issued, subject to the provisions of article 17 I.” (As adopted by the Commission at its thirty-ninth session, in 2006).
 ibid Article 1 (3).
 Redfern and Hunter International Arbitration (OUP 2009) para 11.22 to 11.24
 Dallah Real Estate v. Ministry of Religious Affairs (2010) UKSC 46.
 MAL Article I (3).
 Herbert Kronke ,Patricia Nacimiento , et al. (eds), Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards:A Global Commentary on the New York Convention, (KluwerLaw International 2010) page 32.
 UN DOC CA/CN.9/168, para 11]
Thursday, March 13, 2014
|Pierre Lalive, 1923-2014.|
Professor Pierre Lalive, one of the founding fathers of the modern arbitration law is no more. The loss is heavy for the global arbitration community. His illustrious and elaborate professional experience is difficult to be described in few words. The International Academy of Arbitration Law on its webpage captures his professional experience as : “Expert or Counsel for several Governments before the International Court of Justice; Delegate of the Swiss Government to several international conferences. One of the 7 experts appointed by the Swiss Government to draft the new Code of Private International Law (adopted by Parliament on December 18, 1987). President of INTELSAT Group of legal experts; President of the UNIDROIT Diplomatic Conference on Stolen and Illegally Exported Cultural Property. Arbitrator or Counsel in many international arbitrations (ad hoc, ICSID, ICC, CAS, etc.) Editor-in-chief (and Founder) of the ASA Bulletin. Author of some 200 publications, mainly in the fields of private and public international law, international business law, arbitration and art law."
A void remains after his departure. His theories and concepts will go a long way in the future to shape many successful arbitration practitioners. It was a privilege to have interacted with him during the International Academy of Arbitration Law. May his soul Rest in Peace.
Picture Courtesy: International Academy of Arbitration Law Inaugural Lecture 2011.
Posted by Ashutosh Ray at 2:13 PM
The fourth edition of International Academy for International for Arbitration Law takes place this year in July. The Academy provides advanced Summer Courses in Paris to students and young practitioners interested in international arbitration. The Curriculum is conceived by international arbitration academics and practitioners to cover all aspects of international arbitration, and the Courses are taught by the most renowned experts in the fields of international commercial arbitration and international investment arbitration. The Curriculum includes a 15-hour General Course, alternating between international commercial arbitration and international investment arbitration, 5-hour Special Courses on specific topics, as well as Workshops on institutional arbitration offered by different arbitral institutions. The Courses will be preceded by an Inaugural Lecture given by a prominent arbitration figure. The Berthold Goldman Lecture will be an opportunity to revisit historic arbitration stories. The Academy is an initiative of the Comité français de l’arbitrage (CFA), and is chaired by Professor Emmanuel Gaillard.
More Information can be found here. The last for sending in applications is March 15, 2014!
Posted by Ashutosh Ray at 12:52 PM
Monday, February 17, 2014
The National Law University, Delhi is happy to announce that the 4th Indian Pre-moot for the Willem C. Vis International Commercial Arbitration Moot will be conducted at NLU, Delhi from 7th to 9th March 2014. The Indian Vis Pre-moot has been successfully organized for the past three years by National University of Juridical Sciences, Kolkata, and NALSAR University of Law, Hyderabad. This year, NLU, Delhi is co-organizing the Pre-moot in collaboration with NALSAR and NUJS.
The Pre-moot will be held at NLU, Delhi from 7th to 9th March, 2014, with the rounds taking place on the 8th and 9th. Participation in the pre-moot is open to all teams representing their respective Universities at the Willem C. Vis Moot Court Competition, Vienna, 2014 and also the Willem C. Vis (East) Moot Court Competition, Hong Kong, 2014. The Pre-Moot will have a competitive format, with separate preliminary and knock-out rounds. The oral rounds of the competition will be judged by professional arbitrators, experts in the field of arbitration and international commercial law, and Vis alumni who have performed exceedingly well at previous editions of the moot.
NLU Delhi is charging a nominal registration fee of Rs. 1500 per team (for teams exceeding three members, an additional fee of Rs 500 shall be charged per person) to cover organisational costs. Food and accommodation for all teams is included within the registration fee and shall be provided within the campus premises.
Teams may register by filling up the Registration Form available at the following link - https://docs.google.com/forms/d/1RVFPajJ0veBrh14kuNAdhkvEaDMtk3U8JQY9R9DUMjs/viewform. The deadline for registration is 24 February, 2014. Each institution must register only once. If there are two separate teams participating in the Vienna and Hong Kong rounds and both teams are interested in participating in the pre-moot, both teams should register together within the same form.
The aim of the Pre-moot is to provide teams with valuable practice and experience to ensure that Indian teams can improve their performance as the Vis, especially considering our stellar performances at the Moot in the last few years. So, please take advantage of this opportunity, and feel free to contact the organizers at email@example.com in case of further clarifications and queries.
Punya Varma ( +919910457914)
Mini Saxena ( +919818037230)
Divya Srinivasan (+918527389970)
National Law University Delhi
[This is probably short notice to book tickets to Delhi, but Lexarbitri strongly suggests that every Indian Vis team make an attempt to participate in the Pre-moot -- it really helps in preparing for the real thing!]
Saturday, January 25, 2014
Recently, during a discussion with few friends, a point came up whether two Indian parties can have arbitration seated outside India. This post is to put things in perspective as to how law stands as of today.
In TDM Infrastructure Private Limited vs. UE Development India Private Limited, the court had in clear terms held that “The intention of the legislature appears to be clear that Indian nationals should not be permitted to derogate from Indian law. This is part of the public policy of the country.” Thus, two Indian parties cannot use law of a different country so as to bypass the Indian law.
The ratio of the court was that "When both the companies are incorporated in India, and have been domiciled in India, the arbitration agreement entered into by and between them would not be an international commercial arbitration agreement." Doing so would mean going against the public policy of the nation.
NTPCv Singer also stated that the choice of law could be invalidated if it was against the public policy. The judgment stated that: “The concept of party autonomy in international contracts is respected by all systems of law so far as it is not incompatible with (...) any overriding public policy.”
Even the revolutionary BALCO judgment has not changed this position of law where it was in fact discussed in a detailed manner by the counsel and it was also taken into account by the bench that:
“In other words, two Indian parties involved in a purely domestic dispute cannot contractually agree to denude the Courts of this country of their jurisdictions with respect to a legal dispute arising between them in India.”
“…when both the parties are Indian, the substantive law governing the dispute must necessarily be Indian irrespective of the situs of the arbitration and irrespective of any provision in the contract between the parties to the contrary….the same principle applies with equal force to the arbitration law too, that is to say, that if it is not open to two Indian parties with regard to an entirely domestic dispute to derogate from the Indian laws of contract, evidence etc., it is equally not open to them derogate from the Indian arbitrational law either.” Reliance has been placed on TDM Infrastructure.
This question also came in as recently as in 2013 in the matter of: Antrix Corporation Ltd.Vs.Devas Multimedia P. Ltd. but was resolved before court could decide on it.
Only in the following two ways can this stance be changed now:
1) A new case on this point is decided by the SC, or 2) an explanation is introduced in the Act through an amendment.
Wednesday, January 22, 2014
The Indian Express today carried an Op-Ed piece written by me together with Anirudh Wadhwa. It is on increasing transparency in Investment Treaty Arbitrations which arise out of Bilateral Investment Treaties. The piece argues the case for the need of transparency and in addition discusses introduction of the UNCITRAL’s Transparency Rules in Indian BITs . These Rules are slated to take effect from the 1st of April, 2014. It also discusses other international developments that have ensued to increase transparency worldwide, such as by USA and Canada.
The link to the piece is here: http://epaper.indianexpress.com/c/2256799